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BEYOND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.
A CASE STUDY OF INDIA, PAKISTAN
AND NORTH KOREA
Since its inception, nuclear proliferation has been a serious concern for international
and internal security of each state. Nowadays, the fear of nuclear terrorist attack is an
ever-changing challenge and threat for intelligence, counterterrorism strategies, gov-
ernments, and societies.1 Apart from the two nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, such a weapon has never been used in war. There are two attitudes towards
nuclear proliferation: optimistic and pessimistic. The optimists emphasise the concept
of nuclear deterrence, which holds that the fear of a devastating nuclear counterattack
prevents states from attacking other nuclear states. Because of mutual deterrence, they
argue, nuclear weapons prevent war between nuclear nations.2 Using nuclear arsenals
means the annihilation of humankind. The pessimists disagree. The spread of nuclear
weapons, they argue, reduces real security. States are not always rational and stable
actors. For example, a failure of Pakistani state could facilitate access to arsenals of nu-
clear weapons for non-state actors. Another problem is security procedures and stan-
dards. Without sufficient security systems, human miscalculation or a simple system
failure may lead to the launch of a missile with a nuclear warhead.3
As it was foreseeable, after the United States had developed a nuclear bomb, nuclear
proliferation proceeded further. The “Nuclear Club” was joined by the Soviet Union in
1949, Great Britain in 1952, France in 1960, and China in 1964.4 Since the 1960s, nu-
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1 Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter noticed: “Consequences stemming from a terror-
ist-detonated nuclear weapon in an American city would emanate beyond the immediate tens or hun-
dreds of thousands of fatalities and the massive property and financial damage. Americans who were
not killed or injured by the explosion would live in fear that they could die from future nuclear terrorist
attacks. Such fear would erode public confidence in the government and could spark the downfall of
the administration in power. The tightly interconnected economies of the United States and the rest of
the world could sink into a depression as a result of a crude nuclear weapon destroying the heart of
a city”. Quotation from: The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, Monterey 2004, p. 3.
2 From 1900 to 1950, for example, one hundred million people died in wars. From 1950 to 2000,
only some twenty million perished. Statistics referenced from: International Non-Proliferation Con-
ference, November 8, 2005, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/2005conference/presen-
tations/Talk_Of_Nation_2.pdf (10.08.2012).
3 More on pessimist and optimist attitude towards nuclear proliferation in: R. Fiedler, Pesymiœci
i optymiœci. Dwa podejœcia wobec proliferacji broni j¹drowej po zimnej wojnie, “Przegl¹d Strate-
giczny” 2011, No. 2, pp. 43–58 (electronic version: https://repozytorium.amu.edu.pl/jspui/bitstream/
10593/2411/1/5.FIEDLER.pdf).
4 President J. F. Kennedy warned in 1963 that by the 1970s 20–30 states would build nuclear
weapons, G. Perkovich, Nuclear Proliferation, “Foreign Policy”, Fall 1998, p. 12.
clear weapon states (NWS) have had a tendency to see further proliferation like the nu-
clear pessimists – as a source of instability increasing the risk of nuclear war. Such
considerations were a push for collaboration between NWS. The first visible result was
the signing of the Ban Treaty in 1963, banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer
space, and underwater. By the end of the 1960s, efforts to stop nuclear proliferation re-
sulted in the signing, in 1968, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered
into force in 1970 and has been the most effective among other legal instruments. The
basic assumption of the NPT is that by abstaining from nuclear weapons, countries are
accorded the fully-fledged benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It was a rare
example of efficient collaboration between the Soviet Union and the United States, fo-
cused on non-proliferation activity. The number of nuclear weapons in the world de-
clined from a peak of 65,000 in 1986 to roughly 27,000 in 2004.5
As Cirincione observed, “Since the signing of the NPT, many more countries have
given up nuclear weapon programs than have begun them. In the 1960s, 23 states had
nuclear weapons, were conducting weapons-related research, or were actively discussing
the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Today 10 states have nuclear weapons or are believed to
be seeking them”.6 Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, former Soviet republics, have
given their nuclear arsenals back to Russia. South Africa has decided to abandon its nu-
clear programme and to destroy its nuclear warheads. Libya has decided to end its
programme as well. Such positive examples can be seen as a considerable success and
a demonstration of the credibility of the NPT. In 1995, it was indefinitely extended, and
an Additional Protocol was introduced which in a substantial way, enhances the powers
of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections.
Table 1
States with nuclear weapons or programmes-past and present
States with nuclear weapons Programmes terminated or consideration ended after 1970
China
France
United Kingdom
United States
India
Pakistan
Russia
Israel*
North Korea
Argentina
Australia
Belarus
Canada
Brazil
Iraq
Kazakhstan
Libya
Romania
South Africa
South Korea
Switzerland
Spain
Taiwan
Ukraine
Yugoslavia
Suspected programmes or weapons Programmes terminated or consideration ended before 1970
Iran Egypt
Italy
Japan
Norway
Sweden
West Germany
* Did not test its nuclear bomb-still a covert nuclear state.
Source: J. Cirincione, Bomb Scare. The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons, New York 2007, p. 44.
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5 J. Cirincione, J. Wolfsthal, M. Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
Threats, Washington 2005, p. 8.
6 Quotation from: J. Cirincione, Bomb Scare. The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons, New
York, 2007, p. 44.
A fundamental problem, however, is that the NPT does not include all states. There
are also other issues.
1. Member states of the NPT unwilling to fulfil Article 6, which calls for total nu-
clear disarmament. Nowadays, after more than 40 years of the functioning of the NPT,
nuclear arsenals and proliferation are still a real threat to international security.
2. States not being parties to the Treaty, namely India, Pakistan, Israel, and North
Korea (which decided to withdraw from it in 2003). They all possess nuclear arsenals.
Pakistan and India have tested nuclear bombs, so has North Korea. The only exception
is Israel. Its authorities have never openly admitted to possessing nuclear weapons. Un-
like India, Pakistan, and North Korea, Israel has never tested any.
3. The Iraq war in 2003. It turned out that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction,
paradoxically strengthening the argument that inspection regimes such as the one im-
posed on Iraq during the 1990s can indeed be effective instruments for slowing or stop-
ping the spread of nuclear weapons.7
However, until now the non-proliferation regime has managed to function without
any serious crisis. But nuclear proliferation should be seen as a rising threat. Past expe-
riences with India’s, Pakistan’s, and North Korea’s nuclear programmes can be an ana-
lytical model for foreseeing future trends in proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is
important to consider whether others would still follow their example. Another prob-
lem are the double standards, which weaken the non-proliferation regime.
“Nuclear anarchy” or a “nuclear crowd” undermining international security is still
a real threat. In the last 50 years, states have avoided mass, uncontrolled nuclear prolif-
eration, but in the near future such a scenario is more real than during the Cold War. Ac-
cording to Pilat’s gloomy prediction, an uncontrolled expansion of nuclear weapons
would result in: “1. a climate of pervasive insecurity; 2. widespread nuclear prolifera-
tion and a fear of nuclear terrorism, with overwhelming suspicions and threats and the
prospect of weapon use; 3. the development as a ‘hedge’ of latent nuclear capabilities
by all states able to do so, with many states moving to develop and deploy nuclear
weapons; 4. the reversal of two decades of dramatic nuclear arms reductions and the
emergence of new arms races; 5. growth in the significance of defences, both active and
passive; 6. the collapse of the NPT, and other elements of the non-proliferation regime
or, more likely, their increasing irrelevance”.8 When considering such threats to the
world’s security, it is interesting to analyse states’ motivations for seeking nuclear
weapons. India, Pakistan, and North Korea are interesting examples. For the first two, it
is important to analyse nuclear proliferation in the context of a tense regional conflict
between them. North Korea decided to develop nuclear weapons as a way of preserving
its totalitarian regime.
The main aim of this article is to analyse motivations of India, Pakistan and North
Korea related to acquiring nuclear weapons and answer the questions of why these
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7 Ch. Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Adviser to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Septem-
ber 30, 2004, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/index.html
(22.07.2012).
8 A quotation from: J. F. Pilat, The End of the NPT Regime?, “International Affairs” 2007,
Vol. 83, No. 3, p. 470.
states decided to be outside the NPT Treaty and how these three states perceive their nu-
clear status.
THE INDIAN AND PAKISTANI POSITIONS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
CONFLICT IN THE SHADOW OF NUCLEAR BOMBS
Since their partition in 1947, India and Pakistan have fought three major wars and
remained on the brink of conflict for more than six decades. Waltz maintained, for ex-
ample, that nuclear weapons preserve an “imperfect peace” on the subcontinent be-
tween India and Pakistan.9 A major regional nuclear conflict between them would be
horrible for the people of the region and the international community and could lead to
a nuclear winter negatively affecting agriculture on a global scale.10
India’s nuclear programme started in the 1940s, and in spite of its exclusion from in-
ternational nuclear assistance, two nuclear test explosions were carried out: one,
Pokhran-I (Operation Smiling Buddha) in 1974 and the other, Pokhran-II (Operation
Shakthi), in 1998.11 On May 11, 1998, India conducted three nuclear tests, one of which
involved the detonation of a thermonuclear device. Pakistan responded on May 28,
1998, with an announcement that it had conducted five nuclear tests of its own.12
Table 2
India’s nuclear forces in 2007
Type/Designation
Range
(kilometers)
Payload
(kilograms)
Comments
1 2 3 4
Aircraft
Jaguar IS/IB/Shamsher 1,600 4,775 At Ambala Air Force Station
Mirage 2000H/Vajra 1,850–3,000 6,300 At Gwalior Air Force Station
Missiles
Prithvi I 150 1,000 Army version. Deployed with 333 and 355 Missile
Groups. Will be converted from liquid fuel to solid fuel
Agni I 700 1,000 Last test-launched July 4, 2004. “Inducted” into Army’s
new 334 Missile Group, but operational status uncertain
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9 S. D. Sagan, K. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, New York 2003,
p. 109.
10 L. J. Korb, A. Rothman, No first use: The way to contain nuclear war in South Asia, “Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists” 2012, Vol. 68, No. 2, p. 55.
11 As noted by Monto, India’s nuclear program consists of three stages: “The first stage involves
natural uranium fuelled pressurized heavy water reactors; the second stage features fast breeder reac-
tors utilizing plutonium-based fuel and the third stage includes advanced nuclear power systems for
utilization of thorium”. Quotation from: G. Monto, Nuclear India – to be or not to be?, “Current Sci-
ence” 2012, Vol. 102, No. 7, p. 974.
12 See more in: S. Ahmed, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program, “International Security” 1999,
Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 178–204.
1 2 3 4
Agni II 2,000+ 1,000 Last test-launched August 29, 2004. “Inducted” into
Army’s 335 Missile Group, but operational status un-
certain
Agni III 3,000+ 1,500 Under development. Last test-launched April 12, 2007
Dhanush ~350 ~1,000 Under development. Naval version of Prithvi II. Last
test-launched March 30, 2007
Prithvi III (Sagarika) 300+ ~1,000 Under development. Last test-launched May 12, 2005
Source: India’s nuclear forces, 2007, “Bulletin of Atomic Scientists”, July/August 2007, p. 76.
Kristensen and Norris, the authors of the “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces”, estimated
that Pakistan’s nuclear forces had a nuclear weapon stockpile of 90–110 nuclear war-
heads in 2011, an increase from the estimated 70–90 warheads in 2009.13 Pakistan’s nu-
clear programme is developing faster than earlier estimations. Another problem is the
security of Pakistan’s nuclear depots. Outside Pakistan, observers wondered if the nu-
clear arsenal was secure from potential terrorist theft; inside Pakistan, observers won-
dered whether the arsenal was safe from a possible Indian incursion. In 2011, the
revelation that for years Osama bin Laden had been hidding in Abbottabad, Pakistan,
only 16 km from a large military weapons depot, once again raised questions about
the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Experts who analyse Pakistan’s nuclear
programme see a terrorist threat from at least three angles: 1. Expansion of the nuclear
arsenal. More nuclear weapons, fissile materials, and scattered nuclear depots need ad-
ditional security systems; 2. Non-central nuclear command. Pakistan does not have
a specific nuclear doctrine and therefore relies on a flexible response to crises. This
could lead to nuclear weapon use in response to less than imminent threats to national
existence. Terrorists operating in remote areas with nuclear depots under local com-
mand, they argue, would have an easier time gaining access to and using nuclear weap-
ons not under strict centralised state control; and 3. Growing risk of insider inclusion.
The increasing number of people who have access to Pakistan’s nuclear programme
with secure materials, safety codes, and overall sensitive data creates some uncertainty
about the efficiency of security procedures. These doubts are considerable, because
such an attack was launched in May 2011 on Pakistan’s Mehran Naval Station. Unfor-
tunately, it is probable that in the future there will be such an attack against some ele-
ment of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure.14
One should consider not only the risk of nuclear war or terrorist attack and the theft
of nuclear weapons, but also the very short times of missile flights with nuclear war-
heads on board in this area. Insufficient control systems or a technical breakdown could
turn into a catastrophe. If a missile is accidently launched as a result of insufficient con-
trol systems or technical breakdown, there will be very little time to inform the other
side.
Beyond the Non-Proliferation treaty. A Case study of India, Pakistan and North Korea 33
13 H. M. Kristensen, R. S. Norris, Pakistan’s nuclear forces, “Bulletin of Atomic Scientists” 2011,
Vol. 67, No. 4, p. 94.
14 See more in: Ch. P. Blair, Fatwas for fission: Assessing the terrorist threat to Pakistan’s nu-
clear assets, “Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists” 2011, Vol. 67, No. 6, pp. 19–33.
Table 3
Estimated Time Duration of Some Possible Missile Flights in South Asia
Launch Point Target Distance (km)
Estimated Total Flight
times (minutes)
Airbase Near Karachi Thiruvanatpuram 2000 13
Sargodha Airbase Mumbai 1470 11
Agra Airbase Karachi 1128 10
Agra Airbase Lahore 608 8
Sargodha Airbase New Delhi 581 8
Depressed Trajectory Flight 600 5
Source: Z. Mian, R Rajaraman, M. V. Ramana, Early Warning in South Asia: Constraints and Implications, “Sci-
ence and Global Security” 2003, Vol. 11, pp. 109–150.
Nuclear weapons as a tool for the rivalry between India and Pakistan have a nega-
tive effect on the regional security environment. However, both states, despite the pos-
sibility of a destructive nuclear war, have decided to increase their nuclear arsenals. In
the analytical approach, Sagan suggested that proliferation could arise from one or
more of three classic foreign policy motives:
1. The need to match power for power,
2. The desire to reinforce national self-esteem, and
3. The selfish demands of narrow domestic constituencies (usually atomic and milita-
ry bureaucracies and their supporters).15
Indian motives to acquire nuclear weapons, according to Sagan’s model:
Ad 1. China’s threat and no real ally in the world. In 1962, India fought and lost a di-
sastrous border war with China. Then, in October 1964, China exploded its first nuclear
bomb. India is within range of most of the 140 Chinese nuclear warheads.16 On top of
that, there is the unsettled border dispute with Pakistan. India needed power to enhance
its regional position in a rather unfriendly neighbourhood. Such visible power was nat-
urally nuclear weapons.
Ad 2. Since 1947, India has survived many failures, both military and political. Its
democratic system is a unique example in South Asia, but one ridden by internal ethnic
religious conflicts. With a record of so few successes, India badly needed an additional
attribute to reinforce its national self-esteem. The nuclear programme was very expen-
sive, but less risky than a war with some of India’s neighbours. The nuclear test in 1974
was a statement of national pride. It was not only a signal to the outside world, but also
a tool for interior policy sending a clear message – we are now a real regional power,
and if anyone dares attack us, we will use this tremendous weapon against them.
Ad 3. In the beginning, India’s authorities expressed contradictory opinions on pur-
suing a nuclear programme. Some representatives were afraid that India’s nuclear
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15 S. D. Sagan, Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb, “In-
ternational Security” 1996/7, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 54–86.
16 More: H. M. Kristensen, R.S. Norris, Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2011, “Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists” 2011, Vol. 67, No. 6, pp. 81–87.
bomb could ignite an arms race in South Asia. However, Hommi Bhabba, the head of
India’s Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), was the most ardent supporter of obtaining
a nuclear weapon. According to the reports presented by the AEC, India would develop
nuclear weapons in 18 months, and the cost of producing 50 nuclear bombs would be
less than 21 million USD (1968 USD).17 These excessively optimistic reports and strong
lobbying paved the way for a nuclear military programme. However, Bhabba’s successor
at the AEC, Vikram Sarabhai, strongly opposed it. After his death in 1971, the pro-bomb
lobby in the AEC effectively convinced the prime minister, Indira Gandhi, to develop
one. The first nuclear test was conducted in May 1974, the second in 1998.
Pakistani motives for acquiring nuclear weapons, according to Sagan’s model:
Ad 1. Pakistan as a state was established in 1947. In conflict with India, it strongly
needed an additional attribute from the outset, to match its regional position. Work on
the nuclear programme sped up after India’s atomic explosive test in 1974. As it turned
out, it was easier to produce a nuclear bomb than to win a war with India. Nuclear weap-
ons enhanced Pakistan’s regional power.
Ad 2. Pakistan was the first Muslim nuclear state. General Zia-ul-Haq imposed
a military dictatorship for 11 years (1977–1988) and on several occasions presented Pa-
kistan’s nuclear programme as a part of a civilised search for power. On one occassion,
he emphasised: “China, USRR and Israel in the Middle East, possess the atomic arms.
No Muslim country possess any. If Pakistan has such a weapon, it would reinforce the
power of the Muslim World”.18
Ad 3. The father of Pakistan’s nuclear programme is Dr A. Q. Khan. He worked for
three years in the European nuclear energy consortium URENCO. When he returned to
Pakistan in 1975, he brought with him stolen sensitive nuclear knowledge, including
blueprints for centrifuges. By the mid-1980s, Pakistan was so advanced it had the capa-
bility to make a nuclear bomb. Dr Khan not only played a decisive role as a researcher
in Pakistan’s nuclear programme, but was also a smart organiser who created his net-
work specialising in assisting other states in nuclear programmes. The Pakistan Armed
Forces too, lobbied for obtaining nuclear weapons. It is interesting to note that in Paki-
stan the elites and society were interested in a nuclear programme as a means for having
a state that was not only more powerful, but also more prestigious.
The justification is weird: Pakistani authorities do not control non-state actors and
terrorist organisations on Pakistan’s soil.
NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR STRATEGY TO PRESERVE THE
TOTALITARIAN REGIME
John F. Kennedy acknowledged in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis that even
a small number of nuclear weapons can sometimes deter even the most powerful of
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18 S. Yasmeen, Is Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb an Islamic Bomb?, “Asian Studies Review” 2001,
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states.19 This statement is only partly true when it comes to North Korean nuclear ex-
plosives. As noted by experts from the “Bulletin of Atomic Scientist”, North Korea has
nuclear bombs, but not much of nuclear arsenal.20 North Korea’s nuclear military
programme is designed to do many things: disrupt, distract, garner attention, provide
regime survival and a means for ensuring negotiating leverage. North Korea’s totalitar-
ian regime is based ideologically on the Juche concept.21 This is an adaptation of Marx-
ism-Leninism to Korean realities. Juche also means a consistent isolationist policy,
based on the “uniqueness” of that system. Despite being one of the world’s poorest
countries, with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of $ 1,700, North Korea
continues to pursue nuclear weapons and spends 25 per cent of its GDP on defence each
year.22
The North Korean totalitarian regime started its nuclear programme in 1952. Under
the pressure of Soviet Russia it acceded to the NPT in 1985. For many years, interna-
tional public opinion did not believe that North Korea was capable of developing a nu-
clear programme. The first IAEA inspection was done in 1992. Then the Yongbyon
nuclear facility came under suspicion. The years 1992–2002, when uranium enrich-
ment was being conducted and North Korea refused special inspections in Yongbyon,
were critical. In January 2003, North Korea left the NPT. From 2002 onward, North
Korea has had not only an advanced nuclear programme, but also intensively tested
missiles. Just after leaving the NPT, the communist regime tested its two short-range
missiles over the Sea of Japan.23 The North Korean nuclear arsenal is estimated at
8–23 weapons, regarding their plutonium production capacity.24
North Korea’s decision to develop a military nuclear programme was based on the
following reasons:
1. Economic disparity between North and South Korea growing dramatically. For
example, in 1990–1993 North Korea’s defence budget decreased by 58%, from
$5.23 billion to $2.19 billion, whereas South Korea’s was six times greater;25
2. Growing international isolation, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union
and loss of security guarantees given by the Communist Bloc;
3. South Korean rapprochement with China and Russia; and
4. Russia’s stoppage of oil exports to North Korea. The beginning of the 1990s was
a very difficult period for North Korea. Additionally, in the first half of the 1990s the
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20 S. S. Hecker, Denuclearizing North Korea, “Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists” 2008, Vol. 64,
No. 2, p. 54.
21 B. Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History, New York 2005, pp. 214–215.
22 J. Cirincione, Bomb Scare. The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons, New York 2007,
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23 T. Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence In the 21st Century. Lessons from the Cold War for a new Era
of Strategic Piracy, Rand Corporation 2012, p. 104.
24 J. D. Pollack, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program to 2015: Three Scenarios, “Asia Pol-
icy” 2007, No. 3, p. 116.
25 J. L. Fuqua, Nuclear Endgame: The Need for Engagement with North Korea, London 2007,
pp. 92–93.
state was devastated by massive flooding, which negatively impacted on agriculture
and food production resulting in famine.26
There were several factors in North Korea’s decision to obtain a nuclear bomb:
1. Nuclear weapons for security, 2. Nuclear bomb addressing domestic policy, and
3. Nuclear weapons for enhancing international policy. The last factor is used in a par-
ticular way. North Korea treats nuclear weapons as a tool for negotiations with the out-
side world. As Habib emphasised, “The nuclear capability gives the regime the
bargaining leverage it needs to plug holes in its economy with inputs of aid from the in-
ternational community. North Korea derives approximately one third of its revenues
from international aid”.27 After famine in the 1990s, the totalitarian regime partly
eroded. In economic terms, the authorities were forced to introduce some changes that
were positive for small enterprises. The nuclear programme aims at extending and
strengthening the North Korean regime and its economic survival. Without interna-
tional aid, North Korea’s economy would not be able to provide vital goods such as
food, medicine, or fuel for its inhabitants.
In February 2007, North Korea’s authorities signed the Denuclearization Action Plan
(DAP) as a result of the six-party talks (the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council and Germany). In the DAP, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
agreed among other things to shut down the Yongbyon nuclear facility.28 However, in
July 2007 North Korea closed the facility temporarily. Two years later, it made accusa-
tions that South Korea was under the American nuclear umbrella. Finally, the DPRK’s
authorities declared their withdrawal from the six-party talks and the restoration of its de-
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26 “International aid has clearly been an important component of North Korea’s splintered
post-famine economic system, yet the role that it plays in maintaining this system is complex. From
1996 to 2005, aid constituted approximately 37% of North Korea’s gross national income, peaking at
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the Songun system, “The Pacific Review” 2011, Vol. 24, No. 1, p. 54.
28 In the DAP, North Korea agreed that: “1. The DPRK will shut down and seal for the purpose of
eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and invite
back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA
and the DPRK. 2. The DPRK will discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs as de-
scribed in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods, that would be aban-
doned pursuant to the Joint Statement. 3. The DPRK and the US will start bilateral talks aimed at
resolving pending bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations. The US will begin the
process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism and advance the pro-
cess of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.
4. The DPRK and Japan will start bilateral talks aimed at taking steps to normalize their relations in
accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the
outstanding issues of concern. 5. Recalling Section 1 and 3 of the Joint Statement of 19 September
2005, the Parties agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK.
In this regard, the Parties agreed to the provision of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK in the
initial phase. The initial shipment of emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy
fuel oil (HFO) will commence within next 60 days”. Quotation from: North Korea – Denuclearization
Action Plan, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Policy, 13 February 2007; http://www.acro-
nym.org.uk/proliferation-challenges/regional-challenges/north-koreadprk/north-korea-denucleariza-
tion-action-plan (10.08.2012).
funct nuclear facilities. In May 2009, North Korea announced it had conducted a second
nuclear test, more successful than the previous one, in 2006. Evidently, the DPRK’s au-
thorities are playing the nuclear card to attract attention and, as a result, international aid.
* * *
India, North Korea, and Pakistan are three examples of declared nuclear states, with
a spike in nuclear proliferation outside of the NPT. Each of the states, despite interna-
tional condemnation, decided to acquire nuclear weapons. The fourth example is Isreal,
but its authorities have never officially admitted to possessing nuclear weapons.
The nuclear statuses of India, North Korea, and Pakistan undermine the NPT sys-
tem, which for decades has been a massive barrier for wild and uncontrolled prolifera-
tion. The system was effective, because Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and South
Africa were a part of it, and it restrained the nuclear aspirations of other states. India,
Pakistan, and North Korea, having decided to develop their nuclear arsenals, could be
an example to other states. A weaker NPT system might fight an avalanche of other
member states withdrawing.
Power and prestige were the motivational factors in India’s, North Korea’s, and Pa-
kistan’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons. They also were a more visible means for
bargaining with the international community, gaining additional support, and adding to
the inner and outer policies. The real challenge for security is bitter rivalry and conflict
between India and Pakistan. Both states have nuclear arsenals. On one hand, it freezes
a conventional conflict, on the other, an isolated incident like a terrorist attack, can dan-
gerously turn into a nuclear war. Other threats are: a relatively short distance between
India and Pakistan and unstable political systems. Technical incidents or nuclear theft
can lead to a nuclear war.
Hyman analysed model pro-bomb and anti-bomb spins. For relatively poor and de-
veloping states such as India or the even poorer Pakistan, developing nuclear
programmes involved massive costs and sacrifices for their nations.
Table 4
Hyman’s model pro-bomb and anti-bomb spins
Issue-Area Pro-Bomb Spin Anti-Bomb Spin
1 2 3
Military-
-Strategic
– Bomb will deter attack
– Bomb can be used tactically
– Bomb makes up for conventional military
deficits
– Bomb will invite attack
– Any use of bomb risks escalation
– Bomb is logistical nightmare and too big for
most targets
Diplomatic-
-Reputational
– Bomb will raise national prestige
– Others are going nuclear
– Abstaining will raise national prestige
– Others will only go nuclear if we do
– Others will be alienated if we go back on our
word
Economic – We can easily break our commitment to
a peaceful nuclear programme
– Bombs are cheap
– Bomb will give us more power in trade and
aid talks
– Bombs are dear
– Bomb will invite economic Sanctions
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1 2 3
Domestic-
-Institutional
– The people are demanding it
– The military and scientists want it
– The people are not demanding it
– Principle of civilian control of foreign and
defense policy
Ethical-
-Normative
– Bomb would be a statement of independence
from imperialists
– Bomb would be an admission that we are no
better than the imperialists
– Taking vengeance only produces new suffer-
ing
Source: J. E. C. Hyman, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, Cambridge 2006, p. 10.
Although both states were in deep conflict with each other, India’s and Pakistan’s
positions on a nuclear programme were similar. Their societies and political authorities
strongly supported nuclear programmes. The opponents were too weak to stop them.
Military–strategic, diplomatic–reputational, economic, domestic–institutional, or ethi-
cal–normative issue areas, all were important in paving the way for a nuclear arsenal.
The leaders of both states were convinced that nuclear warheads would not only deter
potential aggressors, but also cement their statuses as regional powers. In such thinking
there are several factors not well analysed, including a dangerous and costly arms race
and greater risk of nuclear war or nuclear theft.
North Korea is another example. Pyongyang treated its nuclear arsenal as a tool for
bargaining with the international community, according to the principle: “We can
freeze temporarily our nuclear programme, but you must pay us for it!” Naturally,
North Korea aspires to be a regional power, but preserving its totalitarian regime is its
top priority. The nuclear warheads are Pyongyang’s only assets.
India, North Korea, and Pakistan are examples to other states, especially Iran, with
its nuclear programme. Until now, Iran has been a state-party of the NPT, theoretically
observing the principles of the treaty, and the Iranian government does not want to
change that. Nevertheless, representatives of Israel, the European Union, and the
United States are accusing Iran of developing a secret military nuclear programme. Iran
can follow North Korea’s example and finally decide to withdraw of the NPT.
With the double standards, double spheres, the NPT with state-parties on one side,
and India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel on the other, the situation is potentially
dangerous, encouraging other states to follow suit, which will undermine the regime or
even spark a new nuclear arms race. The Middle East is such a region that can have an
unstoppable and dangerous proliferation of nuclear states. Now, being outside of the
NPT involves costs, sanctions, and international condemnation. Still, India, North Ko-
rea, and Pakistan set a dangerous precedent and do not intend to resign their nuclear sta-
tuses.
ABSTRACT
The main aim of the article is the presentation of important premises which were considered
by these three states in conducting their military nuclear program. In the article both internal fac-
tors, such as political consolidation and strong society support, and external factors, such as de-
terrence and prestige were emphasised. For North Korea, nuclear weapons also became an
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attribute for gaining more international aid. The motives of India, North Korea and Pakistan for
being a nuclear state are worrisome examples, because these three governments decided on nu-
clear weapons,,, despite the significant costs, such as sanctions, a risk of nuclear war or unstop-
pable arms race and the undermining of the non-proliferation regime.
POZA UK£ADEM O NIEPROLIFERACJI BRONI J¥DROWEJ.
STUDIUM PRZYPADKU INDII, PAKISTANU I KOREI PÓ£NOCNEJ
STRESZCZENIE
Celem artyku³u jest ukazanie g³ównych przes³anek jakimi rz¹dy tych trzech pañstw kiero-
wa³y siê w rozwijaniu militarnego programu atomowego. W artykule zaakcentowano, ¿e cho-
dzi³o zarówno o czynniki wewnêtrzne – konsolidacja polityczna, poparcie spo³eczne oraz
zewnêtrzne do których nale¿a³y: odstraszanie oraz te zwi¹zane z specyficzny sposób pojmowa-
nym presti¿em. Dla Korei Pó³nocnej broñ j¹drowa sta³a siê tak¿e atrybutem do uzyskania wiêk-
szej pomocy miêdzynarodowej. Motywy o proliferacji tych trzech pañstw stanowi¹ przyk³ad
doœæ niepokoj¹cy, ¿e ich rz¹dy zdecydowa³y siê na broñ j¹drow¹ widz¹c w niej wiêcej korzyœci,
ani¿eli kosztów zwi¹zanych z sankcjami i ryzykiem konfliktu nuklearnego oraz wyœcigu zbro-
jeñ, nie mówi¹c ju¿ o os³abieniu samego re¿imu o nieproliferacji broni j¹drowej.
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